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The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”) hereby 
respectfully submits this Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (the “Amicus Curiae Brief” or “Brief”).  The Korematsu 
Center conferred in writing with counsel for the parties before filing this Motion.  Plaintiffs 
stated that they do not oppose this filing.  Defendants stated that they take no position. 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE AND REASONS WHY 
THE MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
The Korematsu Center is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School 
of Law.1  The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and 
education.  It seeks to combat discrimination, help communities advocate for themselves, and 
train the next generation of social justice advocates.  Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, 
who defied military orders during World War II that ultimately led to the unlawful incarceration 
of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all.  
Drawing from its experience and expertise, the Korematsu Center has a strong interest in 
ensuring that courts understand the historical context for exercises of power affecting 
disempowered communities, including past attempts to suppress activism and advocacy by 
regulations of the legal profession.  It also has a particular interest in addressing actions that 
curtail political expression through the courts, particularly litigation designed to vindicate racial 
and ethnic minorities’ constitutional rights. 
The Korematsu Center respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion and permit it 
to file its concurrently submitted Amicus Curiae Brief because the document fulfills “the classic 
role of amicus curiae by assisting in a case of general public interest, supplementing the efforts 
of counsel, and drawing the court’s attention to law that escaped consideration.”  Miller-Wohl 
Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus. State of Mont., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982); see also, e.g., 
Missouri v. Harris, No. 2:14-CV-00341-KJM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89716, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 
                                                 
1 The Korematsu Center does not, in this Motion, associated Amicus Curiae Brief, or otherwise, represent the 
official views of Seattle University. 
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July 1, 2014) (discussing district courts’ “broad discretion regarding the appointment of amici”).  
As recently demonstrated in Hawaii v. Trump, __ F.3d __, No. 17-15589, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10356, at *81-84 (9th Cir. May 15, 2017), the submissions of amici curiae can often provide 
additional relevant authority or evidence useful to the Court.  In Hawaii v. Trump, for example, 
the Ninth Circuit specifically cited to the amici submissions of immigrant advocacy groups, legal 
scholars, aid organizations, state governments, business advocacy groups, and others on the 
likely impact of the contested executive order on their members and operations, and explained 
that these amici had “identified specific harms that will result if [the executive order] takes 
effect, bolstering the conclusion that the injunction is in the public interest.”  Id. 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against Government enforcement of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1001.1(k) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) in ways that interfere with the ability of Plaintiffs and 
similarly situated attorneys to assist immigrant clients and express their First Amendment rights.  
The Korematsu Center submits its Brief to provide additional legal authority and historical 
context for the important public interest issues presented to the Court.  The Brief addresses the 
historical backdrop to this dispute, describing prior examples of similar governmental efforts to 
prevent legal professionals from engaging in activism and thereby insulating the government 
from potential challenges by minority populations who are subject to adverse governmental 
policies.  These historical examples establish a well-trod path of governmental abuses that the 
Government now seeks to revisit through its enforcement of the regulations at issue, which 
adversely impact immigrants who are already targets of the Trump Administration’s anti-
immigrant political agenda.  The Brief also provides additional authority concerning the First 
Amendment rights of immigrant clients and prospective clients to receive information and ideas 
from legal counsel, which are rights correlative of the lawyers’ own First Amendment rights to 
engage in litigation-related activities as methods of expression.  The matters presented in the 
Brief are directly relevant to the issues before the Court and further demonstrate the need for the 
relief sought by Plaintiffs in this case, but are not fully addressed in the parties’ existing briefing.  
Accordingly, the Korematsu Center respectfully requests that it be permitted to file its Brief. 
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For the reasons set forth herein, the Korematsu Center respectfully requests that this 
Court grant this Motion, and permit it to file its Amicus Curiae Brief attached as Exhibit A 
hereto. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 2017. 
 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
/s/ Shawn Larsen-Bright  
Shawn Larsen-Bright, WSBA #37066 
Benjamin D. Greenberg, WSBA #44120 
T. Augustine Lo, WSBA #48060 
Sarah Cox, WSBA #46703 
Zachary Davison, WSBA #47873 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6100 







THE FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR 
LAW AND EQUALITY 
Robert S. Chang, WSBA #44083 
Melissa R. Lee, WSBA #38808 
901 12th Avenue, Sullivan Hall 
Seattle, WA 98122-1090 
(206) 398-4025 
Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae, the 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I caused the foregoing document to be electronically 
filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of the filing 
to all counsel of record. 
Dated this 16th day of June, 2017. 
/s/ Shawn Larsen-Bright  
Shawn Larsen-Bright 
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It is no coincidence that the Trump Administration is attempting to restrict advocacy by 
and for immigrant populations while it vigorously pursues its anti-immigrant policy agenda.  It is 
likewise no coincidence that the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (“NWIRP”) is one of the 
initial targets of this effort, in light of its work to interrupt government efforts to curtail 
immigrants’ rights.  See, e.g., Ali v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00135-JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77656 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2017) (class action challenging Muslim “travel ban” executive 
order, in which NWIRP is counsel).1  History teaches that those in power have regularly taken 
similar actions to incapacitate legal aid and civil rights organizations and silence the 
communities they represent by imposing deceptively innocuous regulations upon the legal 
profession.  Examples include efforts during the civil rights era to restrict the ability of political 
organizations like the NAACP to enforce desegregation through the courts; efforts to restrict the 
ability of civil rights groups like the ACLU to advocate for reproductive freedom for women; 
and efforts of the federal government to insulate its actions from challenge by minority 
populations as part of so-called welfare reform.  Yet, the United States Supreme Court has 
confirmed that all of these efforts were unconstitutional restrictions on speech. 
The constitutional rights at issue are those of both lawyers and clients.2  Lawyers for legal 
aid and political organizations such as NWIRP have First Amendment rights to engage in 
litigation-related activities to express their values and advocate for social and political change, 
including the right to advise clients of their legal rights and their opportunity to use litigation as a 
mechanism to vindicate those rights.  And, just as the lawyers’ rights are protected, so are the 
clients’ correlative constitutional rights to consult with and receive the information, ideas, and 
advice that NWIRP lawyers have to offer, to enable their own expression. 
                                                 
1 In addition to providing individual legal services, NWIRP has a significant history of engaging in systemic 
advocacy to advance rights for immigrants.  See, e.g., Ali Khoury v. Asher, 667 Fed. App’x. 966 (9th Cir. 2016) aff’g 
Khoury v. Asher, 3 F. Supp. 3d 877 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Wash. 2015); 
A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. C-11-2108, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160453  (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
4, 2013). 
2 The word “client” is used herein to refer broadly to the actual or prospective clients and constituents of advocacy 
organizations like NWIRP.  It is not meant to suggest full representation or a traditional attorney-client relationship. 
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As further described herein, the Government’s newfound interpretation of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.102(t)’s “Notice of Appearance” requirement as mandating compulsory representation is 
an example of the timeworn, unconstitutional tactic of imposing purportedly neutral restrictions 
on attorney speech to stifle political activism by and on behalf of disfavored and oppressed 
minority groups.  Application of the compulsory representation rule to organizations such as 
NWIRP places an unconstitutional burden on both attorney speech and the correlative rights of 
the actual and prospective clients.  It is only through their receipt of information, ideas, and 
advice from these organizations that the intended recipients will be able to effectively express 
their own First Amendment rights and advocate for themselves.  The Government’s improper 
efforts to debilitate NWIRP also further silences these already disempowered individuals, in 
violation of their First Amendment rights. 
The lessons of the past, including the striking parallels between the Government’s current 
position and prior unlawful efforts to restrict the legal profession, must be considered in 
evaluating 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) as newly interpreted.  To provide the Court with additional 
historical and political background and legal precedent relevant to the First Amendment analysis 
at issue, Amicus Curiae The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu 
Center”) respectfully submits this Amicus Brief for the Court’s consideration.  The Korematsu 
Center respectfully requests that the Court grant NWIRP’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
II. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Korematsu Center is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School 
of Law.3  The Korematsu Center works to advance social justice through research, advocacy, and 
education.  Drawing from its experience and expertise, the Korematsu Center has a strong 
interest in ensuring that courts understand the historical context for exercises of power affecting 
disempowered communities, including past attempts to suppress activism and advocacy by 
regulations of the legal profession.  It has a particular interest in addressing actions that curtail 
                                                 
3 The Korematsu Center does not, in this Brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
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political expression through the courts, particularly litigation designed to vindicate racial and 
ethnic minorities’ constitutional rights.  Fred Korematsu, who inspired the Korematsu Center’s 
foundation, possessed unique experience in using litigation as a form of political speech.  See 
generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), conviction vacated, 584 F. Supp. 
1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  Today, the now vilified Korematsu case serves as an important reminder 
of the crucial role of judicial oversight of executive power targeting the interests of minority 
communities and of the verdict of history when that role is unfulfilled.  The Korematsu Center 
seeks to ensure similar mistakes are never made again. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The Korematsu Center adopts and incorporates by reference the factual background set 
forth in NWIRP’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  See generally Dkt. No. 37 at 1-5. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Government Regulation Is a Content-Based Restriction that is Subject to 
Strict Scrutiny and Violates the First Amendment. 
1. The First Amendment Protects NWIRP’s Right to Provide, and its 
Clients’ Right to Receive, Limited Legal Services. 
The law is settled that “collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the 
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”  See In re Primus, 
436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).  The First Amendment protects attorneys “vindicating legal rights,” 
“advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed,” and engaging in “vigorous 
advocacy.”  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434, 437, 439 (1963); see also, e.g., Conant v. 
Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002).  This “form of political expression” is particularly 
safeguarded for non-profit groups like the NAACP, ACLU, or NWIRP.  Button, 371 U.S. at 428-
29, 440-41; see also, e.g., Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the 
NAACP (Part II), 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 281, 305-07 (2001) [hereinafter Carle]; Jean v. 
Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
counsel have a [First Amendment] right to inform individuals of their rights . . . when they do so 
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as an exercise of political speech without expectation of remuneration.”). 
As a corollary to the rights of lawyers to engage in litigation-related activities, the First 
Amendment likewise protects clients’ rights to receive information, ideas, and advice in order to 
exercise their own rights of expression.4  Cf. Button, 371 U.S. at 428-31 (recognizing that the 
protected activities of the NAACP’s attorneys made possible the political expression of its 
members).  Settled First Amendment law confirms that individuals have a “reciprocal right to 
receive” expression protected by the First Amendment because “the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-757 (1976); see also, e.g., Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (confirming that the “right of freedom of speech and 
press includes . . . the right to receive,” as “[w]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights 
would be less secure”).  The rights to express and receive ideas are logically and constitutionally 
intertwined, and are together necessary to “protect the interchange of ideas” underlying the First 
Amendment.  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Bd. of 
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if 
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”) (quotation omitted).  As 
the Supreme Court has explained, “the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the 
recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”  Pico, 
457 U.S. at 867 (emphasis in original); see also Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 981-83 (9th Cir. 
2015) (expanding “a student’s right to receive information and ideas” to curricula in order to 
avoid “hinder[ing] a student’s ability to develop the individualized insight and experience needed 
to meaningfully exercise her rights of speech, press, and political freedom”).5 
                                                 
4 Consideration of the rights of third parties is particularly appropriate in challenges to restrictions on free speech.  
See Sec’y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984) (holding that third-party standing 
requirements are relaxed in First Amendment cases).  Here, a full evaluation of the Government’s actions requires 
consideration of the reciprocal rights of NWIRP’s clients.  Standing is not an issue; NWIRP has standing to assert 
these rights because it presents its own injury (its own claims) and maintains a special, attorney-client relationship 
with its clients.  See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989).  Additionally, the 
complexity of immigration law and the clients’ likely lack of English proficiency create obstacles for the clients to 
defend their own interests, which further weighs in favor of considering their interests here.  Id. 
5 The First Amendment right to receive has been articulated in a variety of contexts, including the right to receive 
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Similarly, courts have consistently affirmed that a client’s consultations with legal 
counsel are activities protected under the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Mothershed v. Justices of 
the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 2005) (confirming that the right to consult with 
an attorney is protected by the First Amendment); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953-54 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of an individual or group to consult with 
an attorney on any legal matter.”); see also, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 
576, 585-86 (1971) (“[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is 
a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.”); United Mine Workers of 
Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (holding that union had 
constitutional right to hire attorneys to assist its members in asserting their rights); Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1964) (holding that union had a First 
Amendment right to maintain a legal staff to give advice and recommend attorneys). 
Altogether, the reciprocal rights of NWIRP and its clients to provide and receive 
information and ideas are a “necessary predicate” to their respective ability to meaningfully 
exercise their First Amendment rights, and must be fully protected.6  Pico, 457 U.S. at 867. 
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) is Subject to Strict Scrutiny. 
Content-based restrictions on protected activity, such as the exercise of free speech 
through litigation-related activities, are presumptively unconstitutional, subject to strict, exacting 
scrutiny.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).  Restrictions are considered 
“content-based” if they distinguish favored from disfavored speech based on what is expressed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
information about abortion (Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482); political propaganda (Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 
(1987)); advertising (Va. State Bd. Of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 756); the views of businesses on an election ballot (First 
Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 783); books in a school (Pico, 457 U.S. at 866); and a prisoner’s right to receive mail 
(Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2001)).  The context here is not materially different. 
6 The fact that NWIRP’s clients are immigrants is of no consequence to this analysis, as immigrants are protected 
by the First Amendment.  See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(confirming that aliens in the country enjoy full First Amendment rights), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 
(1999); see also, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (stating that “freedom of speech and of press is 
accorded aliens residing in this country”); cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (acknowledging the 
constitutional due process rights of aliens who have entered the country, whether lawfully or unlawfully); First Nat’l 
Bank, 435 U.S. at 780 (“Freedom of speech and the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment have 
always been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause.”).  They also 
have a general right to obtain counsel.  See Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).  Here, the contested compulsory-
representation rule is triggered only when an attorney engages in what the statute defines as 
“practice or preparation.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t), § 1001.1(i), (k).  To determine whether those 
definitions apply, one must inspect the contents of both attorney speech and prospective or 
current client speech.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t).  It is thus a content-based restriction. 
A restriction survives strict scrutiny only if it is justified by a compelling government 
interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  See Button, 371 U.S. at 438.  The restriction 
must be the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.”  United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729 (2012).  Moreover, courts are wary of selective enforcement and 
“[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.”  Button, 371 U.S. at 435, 
438.  Although able to fashion reasonable restrictions with respect to time, place, and manner, 
the government “may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore 
constitutional rights.”  Id. at 439.  To properly assess these factors, the court must analyze the 
circumstances in which the regulation was promulgated.  Id. at 435-36. 
As detailed below, a review of the relevant history and current political climate reveals 
that there is no compelling government interest supporting the restriction at issue here and, even 
if there were, the restriction is not narrowly tailored to achieve any such interest. 
B. Unconstitutional Regulations on Legal Advocacy Have Frequently Been Used 
to Attempt to Silence Disempowered Communities. 
The Government’s attempt to enforce its new interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) by 
requiring all-or-nothing representation mirrors similar past attacks on protected political action 
through purportedly neutral regulation of the legal profession.  These examples provide relevant 
historical context for evaluating the constitutionality of the Government’s position here. 
1. Efforts to Restrict Advocacy for Dismantling “Separate but Equal.” 
The NAACP originated in 1909 to eliminate racial barriers and secure equal citizenship 
rights across the United States.  Button, 371 U.S. at 419.  In 1930, the NAACP implemented a 
strategic nationwide litigation campaign to desegregate public schools.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
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Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 Yale L.J. 470, 473 (1976) [hereinafter Bell].  As part of its campaign, the NAACP met with 
principals, hosted student-parent meetings, posted on community bulletins, and handed out 
leaflets to inform individuals of their legal rights, among other activities.  See Button, 371 U.S. at 
421-23.  These efforts laid the groundwork for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 487 
(1954) (overruling “the so-called ‘separate but equal’ doctrine”), and continued in the wake of 
Brown to provide resources for implementing Brown’s desegregation mandate. 
Following Brown, local legislative resistance necessitated a wave of civil rights litigation 
targeted at enforcing compliance with the constitutional requirements of desegregation.  See 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).  In an effort to thwart that litigation, many 
states redoubled their efforts to cripple the NAACP’s ability to continue using the courts to 
advance its social justice mission.  For example, among other avenues of attack, six southern 
states (Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) sought to restrict 
the NAACP’s ability to pursue litigation as a political tactic by adopting or amending legal ethics 
rules to prohibit the NAACP’s campaign activities.  See Carle, supra, at 299.  Similarly, as part 
of its “arsenal of ‘massive resistance’” to desegregation, implemented in a special session after 
Brown, Virginia amended its laws to criminalize the encouragement of certain litigation 
(“barratry” statutes), the solicitation of clients by a “runner” or “capper,” and the financing of 
litigation (“champerty” statutes).  See Button, 371 U.S. at 423-24; Bell, supra, at 494, 501.  
These amendments were passed in an attempt to limit the NAACP’s ability to locate plaintiffs 
and commence litigation to vindicate the constitutionally established rights of minorities.  See 
Button, 371 U.S. 437-38; Carle, supra, at 299.  Suddenly, the NAACP’s longstanding, successful 
practices were grounds for disbarment and criminal sanctions for its attorneys.  See Button, 371 
U.S. at 434-35. 
The NAACP sued Virginia to restrain enforcement of its newly enacted provisions, 
claiming that the statutes infringed on the First Amendment rights of the NAACP, its members, 
and its lawyers to associate for the purpose of legal redress.  See Button, 371 U.S. at 428.  After 
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two oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the NAACP and found that the 
NAACP was engaged in “a form of political expression” protected by the First Amendment.  See 
Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29; Carle, supra, at 284.  Put simply, the Court held that the litigation-
related activities of the NAACP were “constitutionally privileged means of expression to secure 
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.”  Button, 371 U.S. at 443. 
In addition to confirming the rights of the NAACP’s lawyers, the Court recognized in 
Button the critical role that the NAACP’s efforts played in enabling and facilitating the political 
expression of the NAACP’s members and clients.  These were principally the disempowered 
minority communities of the Jim Crow South, who were otherwise unable to exercise effectively 
their own First Amendment rights.7  The Court confirmed that litigation assisted by the NAACP, 
“while serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the American Negro community, at the 
same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a 
minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.”  Id. at 431.  The Court also appropriately 
noted that for some groups like the NAACP and its members, “association for litigation may be 
the most effective form of political association” and that “under the conditions of modern 
[majoritarian] government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority 
to petition for redress of grievances.”  Id. at 430; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 376 (1977) (noting that “[u]nderlying” cases such as Button is “the Court’s concern that the 
aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights and the means of effectuating them”). 
Importantly, in Button the Court also acknowledged the political reality and 
circumstances in which the purportedly neutral restrictions on litigation were introduced, as they 
are key factors in assessing the constitutionality of government action.  Within the conditions 
presented in Button, the Court recognized that Virginia’s restrictions were overly broad and 
presented an alarming opportunity to oppress minority speech: 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement 
                                                 
7 The Court held that the NAACP had standing to assert its own First Amendment rights as well as the 
corresponding rights of its members.  Button, 371 U.S. at 428. 
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has engendered the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant 
white community of Virginia; litigation assisted by the NAACP has been bitterly 
fought.  In such circumstances, a statute broadly curtailing group activity leading 
to litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression, however evenhanded its 
terms appear.  Its mere existence could well freeze out of existence all such 
activity on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens. 
Button, 371 U.S. at 435-36.  Thus, the critical lesson of Button is not just that advocacy in 
litigation is constitutionally protected speech, for the benefit of the political expression rights of 
both lawyers and clients, but that even seemingly neutral efforts to curtail such activity must be 
carefully analyzed in light of the circumstances in which they arose. 
2. Efforts to Restrict Advocacy for Reproductive Freedom. 
In the era surrounding and following Button, the struggle for individual reproductive 
rights took on greater prominence in the national consciousness, as civil rights organizations 
such as the ACLU vigorously pursued both policy and litigation strategies in this area.  See 
generally Stephanie Ridder and Lisa Woll, Transforming Grounds:  Autonomy and Reproductive 
Freedom, 2 Yale J.L. & Feminism 75, 75-77 (1989-90).  Reproductive freedom is considered 
critical to unwinding society’s unequal race, class, and gender hierarchies.  See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Moen, Women’s Rights and Reproductive Freedom, 3 Hum. Rts. Q. 53, 58 & n.19 (1981). 
In 1973, civil rights activists obtained an historic achievement in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973).  But the struggle for reproductive freedom was far from over and significant 
attention turned to challenging the horrific and unconstitutional sterilization programs that 
remained as lingering effects of the early twentieth-century eugenics movement.  These 
programs were championed by the white upper class, and disproportionately affected the poor, 
immigrants, and racial minorities.  See Edward J. Spriggs, Jr., Involuntary Sterilization:  An 
Unconstitutional Menace to Minorities and the Poor, 4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 127 
(1974); see also Mary Ziegler, Reinventing Eugenics:  Reproductive Choice and Law Reform 
after World War II, 14 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 319, 339, 344 (2007-08).  Women of color 
engaged in an effort to fight these policies and secure their freedom of reproductive choice.  See 
Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race & Class 215-21 (1d ed. 1981) (discussing efforts to end 
sterilization abuse against women of color, waged primarily by women of color).  These efforts 
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were supported by civil rights organizations such as the ACLU, which endeavored to inform 
sterilization victims of their rights and began pursuing litigation across the country aimed at 
dismantling sterilization programs, as part of their broader advocacy for reproductive rights.8 
Just after the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, national newspapers began reporting that 
pregnant women on welfare in Aiken County, South Carolina were being sterilized or threatened 
with sterilization as a condition for continued receipt of Medicaid.  See Mark J. Zummo, In re 
Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association:  A First Amendment Challenge to 
Prohibitions on Attorney Solicitation, 48 U. Cin. L. Rev. 886, 889 (1979).  Edna Smith Primus, a 
South Carolina attorney and cooperating lawyer with the ACLU, met with women who had been 
sterilized and advised them of their legal rights.  Id.  She later wrote to one of the women she 
met, offered to explain the situation further, and asked if she was interested in joining a lawsuit.  
Id.  Ms. Primus’s letter prompted the South Carolina Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline to find Ms. Primus in violation of its disciplinary rules, which 
prohibited attorneys from soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU.  Id. at 890 & n.27.  In the 
background of this decision was the controversial ruling in Roe v. Wade, issued just months 
earlier, and the fact that America’s elite, particularly in the South, favored eugenics policies as 
techniques for reinforcing the social hierarchy.  See Lisa Powell, Eugenics and Equality:  Does 
the Constitution Allow Policies Designed to Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored 
Groups?, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 480, 485-88 (2002) (describing how social elites have 
historically supported eugenics policies as a means of subordinating unpopular groups). 
Ms. Primus challenged the Board’s finding as violating her rights of expression under the 
First Amendment.  See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).  The Supreme Court rejected South 
                                                 
8 The ACLU and other civil rights organizations engaged in an extensive nationwide litigation campaign against 
sterilization programs during this period.  See Poe v. Lynchburg Training Sch. & Hosp., 518 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Va. 
1981) (class action filed by ACLU seeking to declare Virginia’s sterilization program unconstitutional); see also, 
e.g., Madrigal v. Quilligan, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981) (class action financed by Southern Poverty Law Center 
brought by Chicanas subjected to coercive sterilization practices at Los Angeles County Medical Center); Relf v. 
Weinberger, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (class action led by Southern Poverty Law Center on behalf of poor 
black women challenging regulations covering sterilizations of poor and intellectually disabled individuals); Walker 
v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977) (ACLU and Southern Poverty Law Center represented African American 
women in lawsuit against obstetrician who required or threatened sterilization before providing birthing care). 
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Carolina’s argument that differences between the NAACP and ACLU justified a different result 
from that in Button.  Id. at 427.  The Court found no meaningful difference between the two 
organizations, which both engage in extensive educational and lobbying activities and devote 
energy and funds to litigation on behalf of their declared purposes.  Id.  It further determined that 
South Carolina’s solicitation rules swept too broadly and were not drawn closely enough “to 
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”  Id. at 432.  It thus concluded that 
South Carolina’s supposed attempt to regulate attorney solicitation illegally infringed on 
Ms. Primus’s and the ACLU’s First Amendment rights, including the right to advise individuals 
of their own legal rights as a method of political expression.  Id. at 438-39. 
Critically, the Court in Primus, echoing its decision in Button, recognized that expression 
of the First Amendment rights of lawyers in this context is crucially important to the ability of 
disempowered communities to exercise their own rights.  The Court acknowledged the ACLU’s 
description of challenges in safeguarding the constitutional rights of “inarticulate, economically 
disadvantaged individuals who may not be aware of their legal rights” and noted that “the 
efficacy of litigation as a means of advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the 
ability to make legal assistance available to suitable litigants.”  Id. at 418 n.9, 431.  The 
“cooperative activity” of litigation-related expression must be carefully protected in order to 
preserve the rights of both lawyers and clients.  Id. at 433 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438). 
3. Efforts to Restrict Challenges to Welfare Reform 
The circumstances at issue in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 
(2001), provide yet another historical example of powerful interests unlawfully attempting to 
restrict the ability of disempowered communities to use litigation for political goals.  In 
Velazquez, the Court considered a congressional restriction banning recipients of Legal Services 
Corporation (“LSC”) funds from challenging welfare reform laws.9  The restriction at issue came 
in the wake of the “Contract with America”—a manuscript released by the Republican Party 
                                                 
9 LSC was created in 1974 as a nonprofit corporation to deliver financial support appropriated by Congress to 
organizations providing legal assistance to persons unable to afford legal assistance.  Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536. 
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during the 1994 Congressional election campaign that was addressed, in part, to reforming the 
American welfare system.  Newt Gingrich et al., Contract with America 2 (1994) (“The 
government should encourage people to work, not to have children out of wedlock.”).  The 
Republican Congress’s subsequent effort to implement these policies was met with staunch 
opposition by Democratic President Bill Clinton, driving Congress to use omnibus 
appropriations bills to advance its conservative welfare policy.  See Rafael DeGennaro & Rachel 
Sciabarrasi, Monsters of Congress 14 (ReadtheBill.org Foundation 2007). 
Among these appropriations bills was the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996) (the “1996 Act”).  See 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 538.  The 1996 Act included the restriction at issue in Velazquez, Section 
504(a)(16), which was designed to avoid challenges to Congress’s new welfare policies, and was 
introduced amidst a barrage of other constraints placed on legal services lawyers to make it more 
difficult for low-income people to obtain legal representation in suits against the government and 
other civil proceedings.10  See Laura K. Abel & Risa E. Kaufman, 21st Annual Edward v. Sparer 
Symposium Suing the Government: Velazquez and Beyond: Preserving Aliens’ and Migrant 
Workers’ Access to Civil Legal Services: Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 491, 491-92 (2003).  In general, the rights of welfare claimants to access legal 
protections through the courts were not just “curtailed” by these constraints, they “were 
gratuitously extinguished altogether.”  David A. Super, Essay: The New Moralizers: 
Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2032, 2073 (2003). 
Against this backdrop of efforts by the political majority to restrict the ability of 
disempowered communities to challenge their actions, the Supreme Court struck down the 
restriction at issue in Velazquez as unconstitutional.  The Court noted that the restriction “sifts 
out cases presenting constitutional challenges” to insulate Congress’s laws from judicial inquiry.  
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546.  The Court rejected the government’s attempt to “exclude from 
                                                 
10 The Court denied plaintiffs’ request for certiorari on these other restrictions.  Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 
532 U.S. 903, 903 (2001). 
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litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their very 
nature are within the province of the courts to consider.”  Id.  As the Court explained, “[w]here 
private speech is involved, even Congress’ antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the 
suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own interest.”  Id. at 548.  The Court 
ultimately concluded succinctly that the “Constitution does not permit the Government to 
confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner.”  Id. 
Of fundamental importance in Velazquez was the Court’s recognition that restrictions on 
the activities of the legal aid lawyers were ultimately an improper burden on the rights of the 
indigent clients to express and advocate for themselves.  The Court noted that “the First 
Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people” and confirmed that there was “little doubt that 
that the LSC Act funds constitutionally protected expression.”  Id. at 548 (quotations omitted).  
Yet the restriction at issue would effectively result in there being “no alternative source for the 
client to receive vital information respecting constitutional and statutory rights” and “no 
alternative channel for expression of the advocacy” restricted by Congress.  Id. at 546-47.  
Almost by definition, LSC clients were not people who could obtain private counsel.  Without 
access to the courts, disempowered communities may have no practical ability to exercise their 
own activism, which made the attempted restriction in Velazquez “even more problematic.”  Id. 
at 546; see also Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining the suggestion in 
Velazquez “that government action seeking to limit an attorney’s advocacy ‘on behalf of’ a client 
implicates the client’s, as well as the attorney’s, First Amendment interests,” as a “natural 
corollary of the long-recognized First Amendment right to hire and consult an attorney”).  The 
same factors are of particular relevance today, as the immigrant populations being targeted by 
the Government’s current policies could be left entirely without recourse.  As in Velazquez, the 
Government restrictions here should be subjected to a high level of constitutional scrutiny.11 
                                                 
11 Attempts to defund legal services for low-income populations, which continue to this day, have been repeatedly 
used to further disempower minority populations.  One prominent example of sabotage of legal services for political 
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C. History is Repeating Itself:  The Administration’s Unconstitutional Efforts to 
Restrict First Amendment Rights For Its Anti-Immigration Agenda. 
Just like Virginia’s amendments targeted to stifle NAACP activity, just like South 
Carolina’s restrictions on ACLU lawyers’ advice to women concerning reproductive freedom, 
and just like the politicized attempt to prohibit challenges to welfare reform laws, the 
Government’s new decision to enforce 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) against NWIRP is designed to 
disempower disfavored populations and the groups that advocate on their behalf.  This time, the 
underlying purpose is the advancement of the Trump Administration’s anti-immigration agenda. 
1. Current Anti-Immigration Political Climate. 
The current administration’s anti-immigration rhetoric and agenda has been widely 
publicized.  For example, during his campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump repeatedly 
vowed to, among other things, build a wall along the United States and Mexico border, 
drastically increase deportations of immigrants, and implement a “complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering into the United States.”  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 
554, No. 17-1351, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, at *28-29 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017); see also, 
e.g., Marsha B. Freeman, Holier Than You and Me: ‘Religious Liberty’ Is the New Bully Pulpit 
and Its New Meaning Is Endangering Our Way of Life, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 881, 892 n.59 (2017) 
(“[A]s a presidential candidate, Donald Trump early on made the issue of immigration his hot 
button, threatening to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico and bar all non-citizens from 
                                                                                                                                                             
gains involved California’s statewide rural legal services program, California Rural Legal Assistance (“CRLA”).  
See Jose R. Padilla, Lawyering Against Power: The Risks of Representing Vulnerable and Unpopular Communities, 
11 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 173, 177 (2012-13).  CRLA’s early successes in California included: establishing agricultural 
workers minimum wage, eliminating prejudgment attachment procedures, striking down an English literacy 
condition on voting, successfully challenging a reduction in benefits, obtaining retesting for Spanish-speaking 
students who had been wrongly assigned to special needs classes, and expanding free lunch programs.  Jerome B. 
Falk, Jr. & Stuart R. Pollak, Political Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy and The 
Future of Legal Services, 24 Hastings L.J. 599, 607 (1972-73).  In 1968, the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) designated CRLA as the outstanding legal services program of the year.  See id. at 607.  Despite CRLA’s 
success, in 1970, Governor Reagan employed a gubernatorial veto provision to block a $1.8 million federal grant to 
CRLA.  See id. at 599, 609.  Reagan claimed to rely on a government report containing charges of purported 
misconduct, including:  disruption of the prison system and public schools, violation of grant conditions, unethical 
solicitation of clients, and harassing and frivolous legal actions.  Id. at 610-617.  A subsequent OEO investigation 
found that the report was deceptive and that virtually all of the charges were “without merit.”  Id. at 629, 635. 
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entering the country.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 
Tex. L. Rev. 245, 285 (2016) (“President-elect, Donald Trump, has proposed deporting eleven 
million undocumented immigrants and building a wall between the United States and Mexico.”). 
The Government has attempted to carry out its anti-immigration agenda (with little regard 
for the legality of its actions) through a number of channels, several of which have already been 
successfully challenged on constitutional grounds in this Court and throughout the country.  See 
generally Hawaii v. Trump, __ F.3d __, No. 17-15589, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10356 (9th Cir. 
June 12, 2017) (affirming nationwide preliminary injunction of Trump Administration’s second 
Muslim “travel ban” executive order, entered by District of Hawaii); Int’l Refugee, 2017 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 9109, at *78-87, *105-15 (affirming nationwide preliminary injunction of Trump 
Administration’s second Muslim “travel ban” executive order, entered by District of Maryland); 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (denying motion to stay 
pending appeal of nationwide temporary restraining order of Trump Administration’s first 
Muslim “travel ban” executive order, entered by Western District of Washington); Cnty. of Santa 
Clara v. Trump, 17-cv-00574-WHO, 17-cv-00485-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62871, at *97 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (issuing nationwide preliminary injunction against executive order 
threatening to withhold federal funding from sanctuary cities); Aziz v. Trump, 1:17-cv-116, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at *9-13 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017) (issuing preliminary injunction 
against first Muslim “travel ban” executive order); cf. Ali v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00135-JLR, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77656 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2017) (stayed class action challenging first 
Muslim “travel ban” executive order, in which NWIRP is counsel).  While President Trump has 
tried to claim that “his immigration policies would target the ‘bad hombres,’” the reality is that 
“even the ‘good hombres’ are not safe” from his far-reaching anti-immigrant agenda.  Magana 
Ortiz v. Sessions, __ F.3d __, No. 17-16014, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9363, at *5-6 (9th Cir. May 
30, 2017) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (describing the “inhumane” deportation of an individual 
who was “by all accounts a pillar of his community” as “contrary to the values of this nation and 
its legal system”). 
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2. The Historical and Political Context Further Reveals Why the 
Compulsory Representation Rule Fails Strict Scrutiny. 
For the subject regulation to survive strict scrutiny, the Government must articulate a 
compelling governmental interest that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve.  Particularly 
when viewed through the lens of similar historical efforts at disempowerment and the current 
political climate, the Government has not satisfied these requirements. 
a. The Government Does Not Offer a Compelling Interest. 
Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the Court identify what the Government’s actual 
(rather than post hoc) interest is and determine whether that interest is, in fact, compelling.  See 
Button, 371 U.S. at 444.  The Court should view the Government’s selective enforcement of its 
compulsory-representation rule, and newfound purported interest in such enforcement, in light of 
the current political situation.  See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37645, at *39 (E.D. Va. Feb 13, 2007) (considering public statements by 
President Trump relating to purpose of Muslim travel ban was “appropriate because courts may 
consider ‘the historical context’ of the action and the ‘specific sequence of events’ leading up to 
it”) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987)).  Doing so reveals that the 
Government’s stated basis for enforcing the regulation all of a sudden now, after eight years, to 
impair NWIRP’s ability to provide legal services to countless unrepresented immigrants, is a 
pretext for advancing the administration’s anti-immigration policies.  Cf. Int’l Refugee, 2017 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9109, at *78-87 (holding that evidence supported finding that purported 
national security interest was a pretext for “President Trump’s desire to exclude Muslims from 
the United States”); Aziz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20889, at *25 (same). 
The Government’s contention that its belated efforts to enforce its compulsory-
representation rule are meant to combat notario fraud and identify counsel for sanctions rings 
hollow.  The circumstances here show another attempt by a governmental branch—similar to 
those in Primus, Button, and Velazquez—to advance a political agenda (here, anti-immigration 
policies) by attempting to disempower organizations opposed to that agenda (here, an 
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organization whose political mission is to advocate for the rights of immigrants).  The 
Government does not deny that this is the effect of its rule.  Tr. of TRO Hr’g (“TRO Hr’g”), 
37:3-21.  Nonetheless, it claims its motive is pure and unrelated to its political agenda.  History 
advises otherwise.  See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 435-36.  The timing of the Government’s 
selective enforcement of this 2008 rule (i.e., after President Trump began implementing his 
expansive anti-immigration agenda) is further reason to view the Government’s post-hoc 
explanations with skepticism. 
Rather than analyzing the Government’s claimed basis for its new interpretation of 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t), the Court should identify and evaluate the Government’s actual 
“interest” in determining whether the Government has set forth a “compelling government 
interest” justifying the restrictions on free speech.  The Court in Button confirmed that courts 
must consider the political conditions underlying the restriction at issue.  371 U.S. at 435-36.  
Here, the political reality, as revealed by the President’s own pronouncements, is that the real 
“interest” being pursued by the Government is to facilitate its plan of mass deportations by 
restricting the number of immigrants that will have access to legal representation and 
information about their rights, thus limiting the number of legal challenges by immigrants who 
understand their rights.  By law, such an “interest” is not a “compelling” government interest that 
could warrant the infringement on NWIRP’s right to vindicate the legal rights of the immigrant 
population and provide “vigorous advocacy” on their behalf.  See Button, 371 U.S. at 437, 439, 
444.  Nor is it a basis for infringing on the corollary First Amendment rights of immigrant 
populations to receive information and ideas that will enable their own expression.  See Pico, 
457 U.S. at 867; Button, 37 U.S. at 428-31.  In fact, the Government’s belated attempt to enforce 
the compulsory-representation rule comes at a time when vigorous advocacy and political 
expression by and on behalf of the immigrant population is needed now more than ever, as 
immigrants’ rights are specifically and publicly under attack by the Trump Administration.  See 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47; Primus, 436 U.S. at 431. 
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b. The Regulation is Not Narrowly Tailored 
Even if the Government had a compelling interest, and it is does not, the regulation is not 
narrowly tailored to meet any such interest.  The Government principally claims its interest is 
combating notario fraud, yet during the TRO Hearing it was unable to provide any evidence to 
support its theory that enforcement of its new interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) might 
prevent notario fraud.  See TRO Hr’g, 38:19-39:20.  This is no doubt because empirical evidence 
suggests that such regulations actually undermine the Government’s stated interests, by 
restricting access to competent counsel and thus compromising effective representation.  For 
example, empirical analysis indicates that regulation of the “Unauthorized Practice of Law,” or 
“UPL,” bears no causal relation to satisfactory representation, and may actually cause notario 
fraud.12  See Andrew Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Unmet Needs:  A 
Look at State Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 1, 11 (2004-05).  
UPL regulation appears to have contributed to the lack of legal services in the immigrant 
community, thereby creating a black market for unlicensed predators to prey on immigrants’ 
need for legal services.  Id.; see also Dkt. No. 18-1, at 4-9 (Amicus Curiae Br. of Att’y General 
of Wash.).  The evidence does not support the Government’s stated interest. 
The Government also has claimed that enforcement of its new interpretation of 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.102(t) is necessary to identify attorneys for hypothetical disciplinary purposes.  This 
Court has already correctly identified how the regulation is not narrowly tailored to satisfy this 
interest either, as there are other less restrictive methods to achieve this goal, such as requesting a 
show cause hearing.  TRO Hr’g, 41:13-42:6, 44:18-45:1.  Another option would be to simply ask 
                                                 
12 Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch has suggested that the regulation of UPL should be revisited, primarily 
because of the lack of access to competent counsel.  The Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Access to Affordable Justice:  A 
Challenge to the Bench, Bar, and Academy, 100 Judicature 46, 48-49 (2016).  Discussing UPL outside the 
immigration context, Justice Gorsuch listed a number of studies indicating that regulating UPL is not meaningfully 
associated with client satisfaction.  Id.  For example, lay specialists who represent clients in bankruptcy and 
administrative proceedings “often perform as well as or even better than attorneys and generate greater consumer 
satisfaction.”  Id. at 49.  Moreover, the American Law Institute has noted that “‘experience in several states with 
extensive nonlawyer provision of traditional legal services indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers.’”  Id. 
(quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 87-88 (2004)).  Thus, while fraudulent representation is a legitimate 
concern that disproportionately impacts immigrants and other disempowered communities, regulations that restrict 
access to counsel are unproven means for curbing incompetent or fraudulent representation.  Id. at 1. 
Case 2:17-cv-00716-RAJ   Document 40   Filed 06/16/17   Page 25 of 28
 
AMICUS BRIEF OF KOREMATSU CENTER -19- 
2:17-cv-00716-RAJ 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
701 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 6100 
SEATTLE, WA 98104-7043 
PHONE: (206) 903-8800 





























the client.  In short, if identification were really an issue, there are a number of common sense 
ways the Government could address that issue.  Requiring NWIRP’s attorneys to take on full 
representation of all individuals they represent is not one of them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this highly charged anti-immigration political atmosphere, protecting the legal rights of 
immigrant communities and those who advocate on their behalf is especially important.  
Unfortunately, as the historical examples described above reveal, there is a long history in this 
country of the politically powerful seeking to further disempower minority populations by 
imposing restrictions on the legal organizations that advocate for them.  This history is 
augmented here by the Government’s ongoing attempt to reshape immigration policy in ways 
that have already been determined to be unlawful in numerous respects.  It is against this 
historical and political backdrop that the Government’s position should be evaluated. 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Button, and has consistently affirmed, the First 
Amendment protects attorneys who advise others on their rights and engage in legal advocacy.  
Careful protection of this principal helps to ensure that otherwise disempowered populations 
have access to and are able to exercise their right to receive the ideas and information they need 
to engage in their own advocacy and expression.  The Government’s compulsory-representation 
rule, as newly interpreted, follows the historical pattern of unconstitutional efforts to restrict 
these core First Amendment rights in order to avoid legal challenge to the oppression of minority 
populations.  The Government’s interest here is not compelling and cannot survive strict 
scrutiny.  The Korematsu Center respectfully requests that the Preliminary Injunction be issued. 
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